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Abstract 
 
Martin Heidegger’s preparation of the question of human existence was the 
focus of his seminal work Being and Time, first published in 1927. This paper 
refers to Heidegger’s phenomenological work through Heidegger’s colleague 
and friend Hans-Georg Gadamer to focus on how Heidegger prepares the 
question of Being and the problem of language in his later work. In his 
conversation with the Japanese scholar professor Tezuka, the meaning of 
language in the west appears to restrict an understanding of Being by 
conceptualising it ad infinitum. To the Japanese the simple term “what is” 
appears to be closer to Being because it does not attempt to conceptualise it. 
Therefore, Heidegger, Gadamer and Tezuka’s discussion about ontology 
concludes that language does get in the way of understanding Being.  
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Introduction 
This paper discusses Martin Heidegger’s preparation 
and question of the meaning of Being inspired by commentary 
from Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002).  A close friend and 
colleague writing about him in Heidegger’s Ways (1994), 
Gadamer’s commentary is unique because he was a witness to 
Heidegger’s unfolding thoughts and methodology (Regan 2012). 
Discussion includes Heidegger’s question and meaning of 
Being, how time and mood shape the question and how 
Heidegger’s extensive research into Greek philosophy opened 
up his ontological enquiry. Gadamer’s insight into Heidegger’s 
analysis balances the critical aspects of this paper to produce a 
degree of clarity on his discourse and the meaning of Being. 
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Finally, after a section on linguistic criticism, the paper 
culminates in a conversation between Heidegger (1982) and 
Professor Tezuka discussing western and eastern philosophy. 
In conclusion the inadequacy of western language to an 
understanding of Being is further developed. 
 
Background 
Back in those “heady days” of Heidegger’s radical 1920’s 
lectures, Karl Jaspers suggested Heidegger’s work was a 
“…summons of existence itself...” (Gadamer 1994, 139). In a 
chaotic world post First World War one, the issues of history 
persuaded Heidegger to think about Being which he considered 
to have been generally forgotten about in western philosophy 
(Heidegger 2003). As a student of Husserl’s (2001) 
phenomenological descriptive method Heidegger had begun to 
question  the accepted interpretation of Aristotle’s categories of 
Being and as a  concept he found  the 2000 year old answer to 
be universal, empty and misunderstood (Gadamer 1994). His 
question of the meaning of Being began to take shape through 
his study of Greek philosophy to enable a fusion of horizons and 
for Aristotle to come forward as if a contemporary (Gadamer 
1994; Heidegger 2003). Drawing upon Aristotle and 
metaphysics, Heidegger (2003) developed his critical ideas in 
his magnus opus Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) first published 
in 1927. In it he suggests all living beings could be better 
understood by analysing the human Being through time and 
history (Gadamer 1994). More about Heidegger’s Being and 
Time after I define the terms in use. 
 
Hermeneutic phenomenology 
The term hermeneutics comes from the Greek verb 
“hermeneuein” referring to Hermes, the divine messenger 
listening for the content of the message (Heidegger 1982; 
Palmer 1969). Heidegger’s new approach brought hermeneutics 
into a contemporary study of Being made available to him 
through his study of Husserl’s phenomenology (Heidegger 
2004). Heidegger developed the basis for his own philosophy 
and understanding Being promoted as the real foundation of 
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philosophical inquiry (Gadamer 1994).  For Heidegger, Being is 
spelt with a capital B, even in mid sentence to reinforce the 
focus of his analysis. The choice of hermeneutic phenomenology 
as a methodology became clear to Heidegger because of a 
human’s subjective capacity to understand the meaning of 
experience through language (logos) and thought (Gadamer 
1994).  Language and discourse therefore enabled Heidegger’s 
analytic to be made manifest through the method of 
hermeneutics (Heidegger 2003). However, as will be shown 
through the work of Gadamer and Heidegger’s own realisation, 
language constrained rather than revealed the question and 
meaning of Being (Gadamer 1994). 
 
The Question 
In Being and Time (2003) Heidegger asks the question 
about the meaning of Being by suggesting we know what it 
alludes to but we do not “know” what the meaning of Being 
actually is (25). Although an understanding is always close by 
because we are, it still remains vague and average (Heidegger 
2003, 25). Heidegger emphasised therefore we also do not 
“know” the “meaning” of “Being” and for that matter “what”  “it”  
“is.”  With each emphasised word, the complexity of the 
question he sought to prepare for becomes more apparent (25). 
Despite the notion of Being perceived as the “…amniotic fluid 
our thought naturally moves in…” (Eco 2000, 20), human life is 
known and experienced “before” language has the capacity to 
make sense of it (Heidegger 2003). I will develop this point a 
little later in relation to a woman’s biological capability. So in 
defining the meaning of Being Heidegger attempted to 
demonstrate humans state of forgetfulness which at any one 
time means we are both aware of and yet unaware of it because 
we are distracted by going about our  daily lives (Heidegger 
2003). This state of forgetfulness relates to being “thrown” into 
the world and then having to make sense of it whilst in a pre-
reflective awareness and what he called our average 
everydayness (Heidegger 2003).  In this state “…this Being 
which we ourselves in each case are…” (Ricoeur 2006, 354) 
reveals the reflective conundrum of Heidegger’s philosophical 
analysis. Therefore, his question of Being moved from 
Paul Regan / This Thinking Lacks a Language 
379 
 
 
Husserl’s cogito to Heidegger’s dasein, thinking rather than 
Being (Kisiel 2014). 
From the start of Being and Time Heidegger identifies 
the difficulty of his task when asking “what is Being” and we 
are left with questions about “what” and what “is” signifies 
conceptually (25). Yet despite, our apparent “vague 
understanding” of Being, in order to enquire about or ourselves 
transparently, analysis needed a new frame of reference and so 
Heidegger referred to an enquiry of Being as “da-sein” (27). 
With “da” meaning “there” and “sein” meaning “to be” or “being 
there” (27), the objectification of dasein is considered critical in 
the search for an objective understanding of Being itself  
facilitated by “…being ahead of oneself…” (Ricoeur 2006, 347). 
This is because humans are aware first and foremost of Being 
alive and then we attempt to make sense of life in thought and 
language (Heidegger 2003). Hence, Heidegger is right to 
attempt, as a first step towards analysis of Being a need to 
identify something that “is” here and now before it can be 
investigated as a temporal phenomenon (Heidegger 2003, 27). 
 
Time and Mood 
Heidegger asks the question what is the meaning of 
Being through an interpretation of time as a 
“…primordial…horizon for understanding being…” (Heidegger 
2003,   39). The word “primordial” is significant because it 
refers to what is “…primitive, primeval, ancient…distant in 
time…” (Oxford English Dictionary, OED, 1A, n. d). Although 
Heidegger would not have used a contemporary dictionary as I 
did for his treatise the OED definitions do go back to 1398 and 
summarise a number of common usage in quotes since then to 
summarise key words. Perhaps a clearer definition for an 
understanding about why the word primordial is fundamental 
to the question of Being is that it “…constitutes the origin or 
starting point from which something else is derived or 
developed, or on which something else depends; fundamental, 
basic; elemental…” (OED, 2, n. d). In other words, the “what” 
some “thing” in itself develops from (Husserl 2001). This 
something is both temporal and ontological. 
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Time 
The scope of Being and Time is disclosed in the very first 
few pages as temporality, the past now made present which 
now serves as the connection for a new insight about action 
(Ricouer 2003). This required Heidegger to use the rest of Being 
and Time to prepare the way (Gadamer 1994; Heidegger 2003). 
The notion of time however is not one that we can set our clocks 
by but the blurring of the past as an event is experienced and 
gone in the moment (Heidegger 2003; Ricoeur 1990). This 
temporal lived time interpretation of everyday life is suggested 
to start with understanding, falling, which is a state-of-mind 
communicated through discourse (logos). Hence being-in-the 
world and the effect of others on oneself are considered to be 
significant because “…every understanding has its mood, every 
state-of-mind is one of which (dasein) understands… (and) 
projecting (is) essentially futural…” [my words in parenthesis] 
(Heidegger 2003, 385). Such moods include the feeling and 
realisation that it is good to be alive on a warm sunny day, 
smiling at a loved one or thinking about action as it occurs. The 
everyday interpretation of temporality realises the common 
human experience of experiencing life, or being-in-the world. 
For example, the issue of temporality comes alive when 
thinking about the soundtrack of one’s life, thinking about 
music that means something to you at that moment in time 
which is then captured and remembered. From the first 
experience and every time the music is heard again, the 
memories come flooding back, only your life has moved on and 
you hear the music with more experienced and attuned ears in 
the future (Ricoeur 1990).  Therefore, when learning from the 
past, humans live in a tri-dimensional space of thinking and 
existing where the past, present and future are constantly 
informing each other to re-interpret the meaning of life events 
(Heidegger 2003; Ricoeur 1990). 
 
Mood 
Heidegger places dasein’s analysis of itself into a 
practical, everyday meaning of life where dasein becomes aware 
of the moods in which it meets and engages the world (Gadamer 
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1994). Moods have a time element to them too: the young boxer 
who in the midst of training visualises his hero or enemy and 
willing him on to train harder, or the adult son holding his baby 
spurred on to be a good father, and to be kind, caring and 
considerate just like his own father or because his father had 
not been. This mood is evident in Heidegger’s choice of Being as 
a consistent career long focus for study.  Visualise Heidegger 
walking in the hills of the Black Forrest to become a thing 
amongst other things, and adding his human voice to 
commentate on the historical nature of Being (Safranski 2002).  
Perhaps the mood of Heidegger’s approaching forties, his need 
to learn and question, or the mood of his mountain retreat 
where he felt at home, or thinking of his wife of sixty years 
Elfride and where his thinking could be at its most focussed, 
was all pervasive. The mountain captures the insignificance of 
man and yet dasein wants to be significant and meaningful not 
to the mountain, but to himself. Perhaps Heidegger’s sense of 
being in the wilderness of academia post world war two when 
his teaching was suspended due to his early pro national 
socialist speeches in the early 1930’s and dasein being replaced 
by Nazi regimentation (Collins 2000). Hence, Heidegger’s state 
of contemplative dwelling and place in the mountain hut at 
Todtnauberg appears to shape his analysis of Being and place 
(Gadamer 1994; Malpas 2008). 
One mood of engagement is typically Heidegger by not 
dwelling on the delights of love; he dwells on the basic state of 
mind of anxiety and death (Heidegger 2003). Both thoughts are 
perhaps understandable and shape the mood of many post 
world war views, with the re-building of lives and buildings and 
uncertainty mirrored in all affected countries, with an 
increasing rise of totalitarianism; fascism, communism and 
national socialism (Collins 2000). However, in spite of these 
anxieties, Heidegger suggests we attain our optimal ability only 
on rare occasions in our lifetimes. One of those rare events is 
the birth of a baby, but we cannot think or speak of it 
insightfully until observing another baby’s birth, or until we 
witness or give birth ourselves. Then the other obvious 
experience is death to which we are more likely to be conscious 
of as one gets older. In acknowledging our finitude and that we 
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are not going to live forever, with an increased awareness of age 
and mortality, our finitude is fundamental to authentic self-
objectification (Heidegger 2003). Dasein and existence 
temporally become manifest towards a humans end of life, and 
our experience of it means we become at our most capable when 
taking notice of its impending loss and we cling to its 
familiarity (Heidegger 2003). Unfortunately, with the human 
body’s general design fault, the body will eventually fail and 
then be experienced present-at-hand, from a previously un-
awakened state of not questioning dasein’s uniqueness the 
mind takes notice of the body when the body makes us take 
notice of it (Heidegger 2003). 
Despite a human being orientated eventually to their 
own finitude, the effects of being surrounded by other people 
most of our life frequently relates to a state of in-authenticity 
and experiencing our own limitations when encountering other 
people (Heidegger 2003). By questioning the state of 
authenticity dasein becomes motivated to continue or be fearful 
of exposure and so we find ourselves open to the effects of 
mediocrity amongst the masses. This is a process of conforming 
to the expectations of society. Dasein’s authenticity then 
becomes the vehicle to challenge the everyday assumptions of 
life itself, and itself on life (Heidegger 2003). Heidegger’s 
analysis was not without criticism at the time and since but 
what is is generally not known is that he may have agreed with 
criticisms of his use of language to analyse the unthinkable 
(Gadamer 1994). 
 
Criticism 
Being and Time was a stage of development in 
Heidegger’s thinking, further complicated by Heidegger’s 
difficult and technological language and tendency to 
commandeer commonly known terms to signify complex and 
philosophical issues (Gadamer 1994). This led to Heidegger’s 
difficulty when articulating what he wanted to say and he 
noticed that in his attempt to answer the question of Being he 
risked further concealing dasein within technical neologisms 
(Gadamer, 1994). Being literally means existence (Heidegger 
2003, 27) but Heidegger’s use and over use of dasein is 
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suggested by Eco (2000)  to result in losing sight of its essence 
and instead his use of language  led to confusion and a lack of 
clarity.  Heidegger’s unclear and contradictory definition of 
Being in his early work confuses even more (Gadamer 1994, 22). 
Heidegger’s (2003) suggestion that the question Being is 
forgotten is perhaps exaggerated because human beings have 
always striven to understand the meaning of life, coming to a 
point where they realise the taken for granted complexities of a 
moral life is associated closely with the lives of others 
(Heidegger 2003). Despite science failing to focus on man as a 
whole and instead preferring to analyse man through the model 
of a laboratory, Heidegger suggests studying dasein is to analyse 
the whole of human existence, not its parts (Gadamer 1994). 
Analysing dasein may be considered a futile exercise 
especially if dasein has difficulty meeting the basic needs of life 
and the question of the meaning of Being is so difficult to 
articulate, then trying to put it into words may confuse what we 
already know as tacit knowledge (Eco 2000).  In attempting to 
explicate the meaning of the question the Japanese philosopher 
Nishida describes man’s need for religion, culture and meaning 
as “…fragile rafts men build on the open sea and on which they 
drift through the ages…” (Safranski 2002, 305). Safranski 
suggests metaphorically speaking that Heidegger’s triumph at 
completing a raft failed to take notice of the tide and open sea 
(305). In other words he had become lost in the search for an 
answer to the question despite it being before his very eyes. 
Therefore in 1938, Heidegger’s ideas about being-as-nothing 
had begun to be realised, namely the notion of Being 
withdrawing when attempting to get hold of it, to grasp it, or to 
conceive it (Eco 2000). Then asking obvious yet profound 
questions of dasein reinforces a reflective philosophy, and yet 
dasein is the only entity able to study itself and to name itself 
amongst other entities it also names (Heidegger 2003; Ricoeur 
2006). However, this is suggested to add little to clarify the 
question of Being (Eco 2000). Eco (2000) questions studying 
Being and suggests our unique complexity means we are not 
like other entities at all and so the idea becomes nullified by the 
name game which reduces humans to a named entity (29). 
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Again, language intervenes to obscure ontological analysis 
(Gadamer 1994). 
Jackson’s (1999) criticism of Heidegger’s abuse of 
language in Being and Time refers to his attempt to review 
Platonic assimilation of Being to the idea, and reviewing the 
history of ontology whilst also trying to undermine it. This is 
perhaps evident in the page entitled “…the task of destroying 
the history of ontology…” (Heidegger 2003, 41). Jackson 
suggests Heidegger relies on a para-history of ontology, a de-
constructed and re-constructed analysis leading to his own 
conclusions of a contemporary ontology (Jackson 1999, 8).  
Jackson’s main thrust is that Heidegger criticises Plato’s 
interpretation of Greek terms as an interpreter who claims to 
know what the original terms meant, even more than the 
Greek’s at the time (11-14). Jackson identifies a few examples 
in Being and Time where Heidegger “…reduce(s) most 
developed terms to perplexing banality…” (14). According to 
Jackson, Heidegger reconstructs the original meaning of logos 
to mean “…to gather together, to collect…” rather than a 
reasoned argument, he reduced a powerful Heraclitean 
principle into another banal account (Jackson 1999, 14). 
Jackson (14) uses other examples, such as “phys” (nature) and 
“logos” meaning the same, “noein” usually translated as 
“thinking” yet for Heidegger it means “apprehension” and other 
lengthy examples (14). Therefore Jackson suggests Heidegger 
does not reinforce “…language (as) the house of Being…” but 
instead makes it a prison- house of Being (25). Heidegger in 
effect imprisoned Being within his manipulation of language 
(Jackson 1999). 
 
Heidegger and Language 
Heidegger would have agreed with his imprisoning 
Being in language but not perhaps his interpretation of the 
Greek meaning in language due  to his expertise in the Greek 
language and perhaps understanding the Greeks more than the 
Greeks did themselves (Gadamer 1994; 2004b). A question may 
be asked however, did Heidegger make such an implicit concept 
more complex and the above criticism suggests he did.  
Heidegger’s task was made more difficult by attempting to go 
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beyond the traditional meta-physical categorisation of Being 
into uncharted territory and this metaphor helps us to think 
and analyse the word concepts that indicate difficult in 
articulating what is primordial (Gadamer 1994). Perhaps it is 
the naming issue within language, and the cognitive 
restrictions placed on language’s arbitrary nature of 
understanding that Heidegger endeavours to move beyond 
(Gadamer 2004a) and why Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy 
concentrated on understanding, interpretation and discourse 
(Regan 2012).  
Gadamer (2004a) argues interpretations derived from 
such understanding always involve a fusion of horizons, from 
the familiar and the foreign, and language inevitably conceals 
something that is pre-linguistic. As discussed, Heidegger was 
well known for his technical manipulation of the German 
language (Gadamer 1994, 145). However, this seems hardly to 
matter in contemporary times because language cannot keep up 
with the advances of communication technology, for example, in 
the use of the words “ontology” and “temporality” and others 
used in computer sciences and managing data (Stock, Leibovici, 
Delazari & Santos 2015). Perhaps this is an example of the 
inadequacy of language to keep up with changes in the world 
and an example of its inadequacy to understand what is 
primordial, ancient and distant in time (Ricoeur 1990).  Hence, 
the signification of language becomes less meaningful because 
language is incapable of signifying all aspects of life, from 
computers to having a baby, or breastfeeding.  For example, in 
the case of a mother breastfeeding her baby, one only has to 
acknowledge the woman’s biological ability to first have the 
baby and then second to make sense of the experience in both 
the ante and post-natal period through language (Regan & Ball 
2013). This is an example of the mind playing catch up and the 
addition of words to understand new experience fails to 
communicate its full meaning (Regan & Ball 2013). 
According to Gadamer (1994, 146) Aristotle was not 
adverse to making up the odd word himself and taking a 
common word  to create a new one such as energeia and 
entelechia (the most knowable in itself of all possible objects of 
the intellect). Therefore, Heidegger’s study of ancient Greek 
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philosophy in Being and Time gave him a model from which to 
mirror himself on and to make sense of questioning the 
meaning of Being (Gadamer 1994). This appears to confirm the 
inadequacy of language to shape thought about Being otherwise 
restricted by the language-in-use (Gadamer 1994). The same 
constraints occurred in Heidegger’s preparation of the question 
of Being and Gadamer gave and one example which marked a 
start in his turn to ontology in the use of the term “…it is 
worlding…” (Gadamer 1994, 169). Gadamer had been there 
when Heidegger first used the term “…it is worlding…” (es 
weltet) in his first lecture at Marburg (1919) entitled The idea 
of philosophy and the worldview problem.  Whether it was a 
new word or an old word re-visited with a new meaning, 
Gadamer’s (1994) thought at the time was how unusual it was 
to hear the word from Heidegger, a neo-Kantian assistant of 
Husserl. A stage in his thinking about the “turn” and “clearing” 
of Being Heidegger was using the term “it is worlding” to 
identify the world of experience being thoroughly charged with 
meaning (Kisiel 2014). Moving beyond Husserl and yet using 
techniques taught by him, in the Marburg lecture Gadamer 
(1994) recalls Heidegger inviting the students to imagine in 
their consciousness the precise experience of the lecturn at 
which he was lecturing. The entire lecture hinged on this one 
activity and Heidegger remarked  “…I see the lecturn…in 
light…as a background…(an) experience of lecturn-
seeing…living in an environment, it means to me everywhere 
and always, it is all of this world, it is worlding…” (Gadamer 
1994, 169). If the lecturn became a manifestation of the world 
or a symbol of a life experience, the lecturn could replace the 
experience as if it were the world (Gadamer 1994). Hence, the 
lecturn activity aimed to ensure the students “grasped” the 
meaning of his discourse in order to create new meaning. 
 
To Think the Greeks More Greek-Like 
Gadamer (1994, 143) concedes he cannot  defend some of 
Heidegger’s coercive language  in Being and Time’s and use of 
pre-Socratic text but on the whole Heidegger’s interpretations 
are as valid as Plato and Socrates interpretations of the 
incomplete fragments that “shrouded” the beginnings of Greek 
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thought. Gadamer (1994) reinforced a positive view of criticism 
when remarking that Heidegger’s lectures brought the Greeks 
to life as if contemporaries, interpreting to clarify what they 
said and expanding on what they did not say. The process of 
scholastic immersion is an essential factor in the hermeneutic 
interpretation of text and Heidegger characteristically 
elaborated a point by referring to the Greeks, then presenting 
his ideas as if they would be in agreement of his analysis, with 
the past brought into the present as proof of his corrections 
(Gadamer 1994). This has become a common methodology 
within hermeneutic phenomenology, therefore Heidegger’s work 
in Being and Time is based on subjective and enthusiastic 
interpretation to reinforce his point, and does not detract from 
his otherwise worthwhile purpose and rigorous analytic 
(Gadamer 1994). 
Despite Heidegger’s persuasive and rigorous analytical 
interpretations of work where he placed his own ideas as being 
central to the outcome, Gadamer in The Greeks (1994, 142) 
suggests Greek philosophers were Heidegger’s true scholastic 
partners. Gadamer suggests Heidegger viewed Greek thinking 
as being original and having started the process of categorising 
the Being of beings, and as a result Greek thought demanded 
him to think in an even more Greek way, and having to re-
think questions he had posed to himself about their work 
(Gadamer 1994). Heidegger developed an ear for the language 
of these beginnings and after each immersive analysis it was 
described by Heidegger like “…coming out of a hot spring…” 
(143). One example Gadamer (1994) gave of thinking in a Greek 
way was when Heidegger referred to aletheia (what is true) and 
seeing not: 
             “…so much the unconcealdness….of speaking but first 
and foremost the being itself that showed itself in it’s true 
Being, like pure unadulterated gold… thought in a Greek 
way …” (144).  
Gadamer (1994, 144) goes onto give many similar examples of 
Heidegger’s original and insightful interpretations as a modern 
scholar totally immersed and open to the text of antiquity. 
Heidegger’s gift in Being and Time was therefore using Aristotle 
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as a key witness in the analytical task and a process of  “…get 
(ting) back to the things in themselves, (and Aristotle) testified 
indirectly against his own ontological biases…” to spell out 
what had been un-thought in Greek thinking at the time (145). 
Hence, a primordial enquiry into Being through the Greek 
language. 
 
The Problem of Naming 
Gadamer (1994) suggests the criticism of Heidegger’s 
choice of language in Being and Time was in part due to Being 
not being dealt with as a finished product. In defence of 
Heidegger’s use and abuse of language in Being and Time, 
Gadamer writes in the most extraordinary way about his friend 
Heidegger: 
             “…the language… is struggling to be awakened from the 
forgetfulness of being and to think that which is worthy 
of thought. The same man whose words and phrases 
could have such visual; force and power that they were 
unparalleled (by contemporaries)… whose words made 
something spiritual tangible, this same man extracts out 
of the shafts of language the most peculiar lumps, breaks 
up the extracted stones so that they completely lose their 
usual outline and moves around into fragmented word-
rocks, searching, checking…” (25).  
For Gadamer Being and Time cleared the path and made 
explicit the conditions of Being as a project in motion and 
clearly not presented as a finished product but preparing the 
way. Heidegger (2003) stated the same at the time of its 
publication in 1927 (25). The single question was posed and 
explored, not answering it but “preparing” it (Gadamer 1994, 
21). However, the  difficult and technical language Heidegger 
used in Being and Time was essentially due to the problem of 
language and this is exemplified in his famous quote from 
Trakl’s The word “…where the word breaks off,  no-thing can 
be…” (Heidegger 1982, 60). Language’s inadequacy was 
suggested to be due to the question’s antithesis and Being 
withdrawing to nothingness because “…this thinking lacks a 
language…” in the forgetfulness of Being and language 
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(Gadamer 1994, 25). Heidegger therefore in his later work 
moved away from his deconstructed use of language within 
Being and Time into analysing poetry and using well known 
words to conceptualise his thoughts which seemed the only way 
to expand on the inarticulable, the unthinkable, the forgotten 
and primordial nature of Being (Gadamer 1994).  
 
A dialogue on language 
An illuminating account of Heidegger’s later thinking on 
language and Being is entitled A dialogue on language 
(Heidegger 1982, 1-54). The transcribed conversation was 
between Heidegger and a visiting Professor Tezuka from of the 
Imperial University, Tokyo. From the outset the conversation 
makes it clear that language may be inadequate for the task of 
answering their questions. The account was in the form of a 
conversation between Heidegger and Tezuka where they 
attempted to articulate the differences of thought and language 
between East Asian and European philosophy and with the 
help of Tezuka, Heidegger clarifies his position on 
hermeneutics, language and Being. Heidegger is pressed on his 
development of his work on Being by disclosing a pre-
occupation with the concept since reading Franz Brentano 
(1862) in 1907. 
Heidegger reinforced the importance of his theological 
studies being hugely influential in his question of Being and 
disclosed the fundamental flaw of Being and Time in that it 
ventured too far, and far too soon (Heidegger 1982, 7). 
Heidegger stated his ideas crystallised years later when he 
realised the problem of language in articulating the question of 
Being. Hence, after Being and Time he turned to art and 
poetry, notably Friedrich Hölderin’s The Ister and Georg Trakl’s 
1919 poem entitled The word, which I have already quoted 
earlier. In conversation with Tezuka they both refer to the 
Japanese scholar Count Kuki who had studied with Heidegger 
in Germany and had translated Heidegger’s paper What is 
Metaphysics (2004, 90-114). Tezuka remarked that Kuki had 
immediately understood where Heidegger was coming from due 
to the question “what is beyond the senses?” As an example, 
their conversation turned to the meaning of a gesture in a no-
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play (a traditional Japanese play), where a Japanese actor 
refers to a mountain-scape with the slight of his hand, and the 
audience encountering emptiness in such a way that a 
mountain is imagined. Heidegger suggested the inferred 
emptiness is the same as nothingness, the “…essential being we 
add to our thinking, as the other, to all that is present and 
absent…” (Heidegger 1982, 19). Tezuka maintained the notion 
of emptiness is the loftiest name for which Heidegger and 
westerners mean by the term Being, despite the nihilism and 
negativity Heidegger had inferred when referring to the notion 
of “nothingness.” Despite both their scholastic achievements, 
they both conceded the experiential inadequacy of language’s 
ability to express truthfully “what is” and the language 
constantly restricting what their dialogue was about (15). 
They both discuss the western habit of conceptualising 
which may inhibit the thinking process as ideas are categorised 
and rationalised, without the need for the individual to go 
through the cognitive motions themselves (Heidegger, 1982). In 
other words concepts easily mapped out by others to follow. 
Heidegger’s responses indicate his scholastic priority is to 
“show” what is the case by seeking to analyse and articulate not 
what ought to happen as a methodology but what does happen 
and is the case of hermeneutic analysis (11). Both Heidegger 
and Tezuka demonstrate that showing the things-in-themselves 
is an all important path along the way of thinking, and the folly 
of pushing a prescribed method merely a staging point along 
the way which risks scholars moving from one concept to 
another for an intellectual fix. Heidegger (21) suggests such a 
prescribed method would mean going forward and backwards 
along the same path leading to the same place in either 
direction. The way cannot be mapped out like a plan of a road 
and the builder at times must go back to the construction sites 
they left behind, in order to tidy up, dismantle, re-shape or 
build from a new (21). Heidegger’s discussion with a Japanese 
enable these issues to be discussed because if the conversation 
had been with a fellow European then the conversation would 
have been far more predictable. This is because Tezuka 
identifies that the Japanese language has a lack of words for 
some things, and the naming of objects can diminish the human 
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experience. Count Kuki’s interest in Heidegger and aesthetics 
came about as he attempted to Europeanise the Japanese 
concept of Iki, poetry and art, because the Japanese language 
had few words to describe the experience in more detail. As 
Europeans struggle to articulate and understand a concept, the 
Japanese simply accepts “what is.”  Hence, Tezuka recalls 
Kuki’s description of Iki as a “…sensuous radiance through 
whose lively delight there breaks the radiance of something 
supra-sensuous…” (14) and refers also to the experience of 
Japanese art (14). Heidegger’s response was to suggest the 
aesthetic representation of art corresponds to the supra-
sensorial metaphysical doctrines which are perhaps the one and 
the same (14). Hence, Being becomes manifest in poetry and art 
and not when attempting to conceptualise it but accept “what is.” 
 
In conclusion 
Being and Time was a stage of development in 
Heidegger’s thinking, made more difficult when thinking about 
the unthinkable and what is pre-reflectively primordial 
(Gadamer 1994). As has been discussed Heidegger attempted to 
analyse the phenomenon of Being from what had been once 
forgotten in western philosophy to again become part of 
contemporary discourse. The question of the meaning of Being 
which Heidegger sought to analyse through ancient Greek and 
re-conceptualisation of some German terms led to some success. 
This paper therefore has used Gadamer’s (1994) commentary 
from Heidegger’s Way to balance out the linguistic criticism of 
his analysis. Being and Time however was a preparation and 
Heidegger stated this from the start of it (25). What became 
clear to Heidegger (1982) later on however was the problem of 
language when preparing the question of Being and that he had 
gone too far too soon. This primordial Being appears to 
withdraw from us when applying language to make sense of it 
(Gadamer 1994).  His enthusiasm for the unfolding subject was 
apparent in his career long focus on the question of Being. The 
end of the paper then discusses a conversation between 
Heidegger (1982) and Professor Tezuka, a Japanese scholar and 
what is remarkable and revealed in their conversation, despite 
linguistic limitations in the west,  is that ontology is easier to 
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understand and accept as “what is” in the east. This is because 
Being is known pre-reflectively prior to searching for an answer 
in language and the west’s larger language was agreed to 
restrict its conceptualisation. In the Japanese language, Being 
is accepted simply as “what is” and any further western 
interpretation may serve to miss the point entirely. 
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